Greetings Friends:

I’ve consolidated my recent writing and research on Chinese intelligence, technology transfer, and influence operations into a single website: https://www.mattbrazil.com/

The website is intended as a resource for analysts and business leaders dealing with China-related risk and strategy. It includes two new items: a recent white paper presented in Washington, “Gettin’ on Down with Chinese State Security and Public Security". It is an essay about coping with those agencies while doing business in China.

I also posted a link to a journal article on "Macau's Greatest Communist Spy," Dr. Ke Lin. He is a fascinating character who is almost a household name in China but virtually unknown abroad. The full article is behind a Paris-based journal's paywall, but if there is interest I can ask for access.

I’ll continue to update the site with new work, case studies, and commentary, including an upcoming series on CCP influence operations abroad.

I'm back to making progress on the book and have about half of the manuscript done. I had a rethink this year and realized that there is a lot of information out there with detailed case studies showing what we know about Beijing's compromised operations and the few spies who have been apprehended. In essence we have pretty decent information about the "‘what, where, and when’ and the ‘small who’” of Chinese Communist espionage.

These accounts are valuable to sound the alarm about the successes of CCP intelligence agencies, but we end up not knowing much about the the “why, how,” and the larger "who" of China's security state. That system is not simply the Ministry of State Security (MSS), the Ministry of Public Security (MPS), and the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), operating in parallel. It is a Party-directed, whole-of-system effort, driving sections of the broader society, not the whole society. It integrates state agencies, commercial actors, academic institutions, and diaspora networks in pursuit of regime security and national power.

This is in contrast to the "whole of society" idea. Chinese espionage and influence efforts do not include everybody in China, even though the CCP may wish it were so. And it certainly doesn't include more than a small portion of the Chinese diaspora, a group that needs protection from transnational repression, not misplaced persecution.

Still, Chinese espionage is a serious problem: a Party-led system integrating intelligence, security, economic policy, and political influence. We must move beyond documenting cases toward systemic understanding and response. The effectiveness of that shift will be one determination of whether democratic states can adapt to Beijing's challenge.

Australia

Moving here was not as easy as I previously imagined (we departed San Jose, California for the Melbourne area nine months ago in a long-planned relo that had nothing to do with recent events). Much has changed! The public medical system is not as thorough as it used to be: While overall spending has generally increased, specific programs, rebates, and access have tightened or lagged behind costs, creating the widespread perception of cutbacks. However, I find treatment here to be top notch.

Nonetheless it is great to be back. The people, weather, scenery, food, the coffee, the amazing panoply of bird life, and well-resourced public libraries are just some of the advantages (the State Library of Victoria is awesome). I'm enjoying making contacts and look forward to sharing more.

As the book moves closer to completion, I will gradually shift this occasional newsletter to Substack. Any thoughts you have about that and other points raised above are welcome.

Regards,

Matt

​Matt Brazil Non-resident Fellow, The Jamestown Foundation​

Burwood, VIC, Australia. Mobile: (Signal and WhatsApp enabled): +61-431 348 757

Email: matthew.brazil@gmail.com, encrypted: matt.brazil@hushmail.com
​https://www.mattbrazil.com/​
​https://www.usni.org/press/books/chinese-communist-espionage​